Abstract
I. Introduction
Imagine a town called Defendantville in Anystate, USA. If ever Anystate's governor and attorney general decline to defend a voter-initiated law, they can designate someone in Defendantville to defend the law in their stead. None of Defendantville's residents has the power to enforce the state's laws but, for the limited purpose of defending those laws in court, any of them can take on the mantle of Anystate's sovereignty. Now imagine, instead, that a federal statute is being challenged. The government has declined to defend, and a group of lawmakers steps in. This group, too, claims the government's mantle and seeks to enter the lawsuit as defendants.
The questions that prompt this Essay arise at the point when these lawsuits are brought in federal court: First, can states delegate their sovereignty -and with it, their Article III standing -to private parties for purposes of defending their laws?
2 Second, can a subset of legislators take up a measure's defense when the executive branch refuses? The first, of course, implicates what the Ninth Circuit permitted in Perry v. Brown, when California declined to defend Proposition 8, a voter-initiated measure that withdrew marriage rights from same-sex couples, and the court agreed to decide an appeal from the proposition's sponsors. 3 And the second reflects what numerous federal courts have permitted to the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives, which stepped in when the Department of Justice decided no longer to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 4 Through attention to both doctrine and judicial legitimacy dynamics, this essay shows that Article III standing cannot be delegated from governments to individuals in this way, even when those individuals are elected officials. The legal argument here proceeds in three steps. We begin pre-constitutionally, with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) -specifically, with an extended 2 Standing is an essential element of Article III's "bedrock" case or controversy requirement. See Raines v. Byrd at 819. For more detailed doctrinal discussion, see infra at xx. WL 3134429 (Mem.) (Dec. 7, 2012) (directing the parties to address "whether petitioners have standing under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution in this case"). 4 For extended discussion of BLAG and its role in the DOMA litigation, see infra at xx. In granting the writ of certiorari in United States v. Windsor, the Court added this question to the merits-related question about DOMA's constitutionality. See U.S. v. Windsor, 2012 WL 4009654 (Mem) (Dec. 7, 2012) ( directing the parties to address the question "whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in the case."). discussion of Rule 24 intervention. While Rule 24 provides the procedural entrée for outsiders to become parties in an ongoing lawsuit, access is restricted to those with cognizable interests closely related to the litigation. Passionate commitment to the issue before the court does not count; for this reason, most initiative proponents do not qualify. Although they invest heavily in a measure's success, they typically do not experience a change to their own legal status when a measure passes that would translate to the sort of interest Rule 24 requires. 5 The discussion then turns to Article III. Through an inquiry into why governments have standing to defend their laws, it becomes clear that government standing cannot be imputed to private actors or individual legislators, even when those actors have engaged in the lawmaking process. When a statute is challenged, governments have the concrete and specific interest that basic standing doctrine requires 6 because their authority to enforce their own laws is subject to diminishment. Private parties and even individual legislators, by contrast, do not have this same stake because they do not have and cannot exercise the government's enforcement power. Consequently, governments cannot properly extend the Article III standing associated with their enforcement powers to these individuals and organizations either explicitly or by implication.
Next, absent the government's mantle, we see that most initiative proponents and lawmakers also cannot establish standing by the conventional means available to federal court litigants who seek redress for an injury. As noted above, voter initiatives typically do not alter their proponents' rights vis a vis the general population in a way that would give rise to a concrete, particular claim. This is certainly the case for Proposition 8's promoters, whose right to marry was left unaffected by the measure they helped pass. The same is true for those legislators who would defend DOMA, or any other measure they supported. In these contexts, the grievance amounts to a demand for government to enforce its laws in a particular way rather for redress of an individualized injury caused by the government's action. This law enforcement claim is not particular to the measure's strongest supporters. Instead, anyone in the population might make it, 5 Although the discussion here will continue for the sake of comprehensiveness and to illuminate synergies between intervention and standing jurisprudence, intervention law is sufficient, on its own, to resolve most questions about initiative promoters' entry into litigation. Indeed, in Perry, which is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, while the plaintiffs-respondents have arguably waived their objection to the misapplication of Rule 24 by the lower courts, there is no bar to the Supreme Court resolving the case on this procedural ground.
which is why standing jurisprudence has long found it to be inadequate for Article III courts. 7 Because intervention and standing jurisprudence are relatively clear in rebuffing party status for initiative proponents and individual legislators, as just discussed, something more than a doctrinal misunderstanding must be enabling these actors to become defendants in federal litigation. The remainder of the Essay explores why some federal courts have been overly generous in allowing intervention and finding standing for these would-be defenders. By looking at intervention and standing decisions across contexts, including in Perry and in the DOMA litigation, we can see this deviation from procedural rules in relief. It is, I argue, part of a larger phenomenon at the crossroads of procedure and judicial legitimacy, where judicial legitimacy concerns appear to permeate procedural decisionmaking and override otherwise operative procedural constraints.
It is not surprising that litigation involving voter-initiated and otherwise popular measures present a high-vulnerability context for courts that are sensitive to their countermajoritarian position. 8 But it is striking how far procedural decisionmaking in these cases may wind up deviating from what the governing rules and doctrine would seem to require, even when courts are willing to strike down these measures on the merits.
In these contexts, procedural deviation functions as a kind of release valve that federal courts use, probably inadvertently, to signal engagement with and accountability to the public. Especially in decisions regarding intervention by initiative proponents, two related legitimacy concerns come to the fore. One I characterize as countermajoritarian guilt. This concern draws from Lockean notions of fairness and procedural due process rhetoric and reflects the impulse that it is unfair to block initiative promoters from defending their measures after they put in the work to obtain passage. The other I describe as countermajoritarian anxiety to capture courts' concern that the adjudication process will be both tainted and ineffectual if the promoters of a challenged measure are denied full party status.
My ultimate claim here is that although these concerns warrant serious attention, loosening intervention law is a costly and ultimately flawed way to address them. Allowing initiative promoters and groups of lawmakers to intervene as full parties, and then to appeal without a concomitant appeal by a government defendant, defies the intervention rules' text and weakens Article III's constraints. Even worse, this trend blurs the lines of what entities federal courts will count as governments and what interests courts will treat as governmentally-sanctioned. These concerns do not suggest that proponents should be absent from litigation involving their measures, however. Instead, amicus status -including "litigating amicus" status, as needed -is far more appropriate, doctrinally and otherwise, to insure that the federal courts operate with both constitutional integrity and public legitimacy.
II. An Opening Question: Intervention's Scope and Limits
When plaintiffs challenge a law's constitutionality, even in the case of a voter-initiated law, they nearly always sue government officials. The reason is straightforward: the remedy they need, most often, is a court order blocking those officials from enforcing the challenged law.
9 By contrast, participation is not so automatic for initiative proponents; instead, typically, proponents must move to intervene. This section looks to intervention law's gatekeeping function, then, as the threshold inquiry to be addressed even before the question of standing for nonstate actors.
As any first year law student knows, intervention in federal court comes in two types -intervention of right, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and permissive intervention under F.R.C.P. 24 (b) . 10 In essence, intervention of right is 9 In these cases, the designated defendant is sometimes the governor, and at others, it is the attorney general or the head of the relevant state agency, but in all instances, the defendant is an official representative of the state. The reason that plaintiffs sue an official rather than the state itself flows in part from the statute that authorizes federal suits for state-based violations of constitutional rights, which creates a cause of action against persons who deprive others of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. More significantly, sovereign immunity doctrine bars the state from being sued directly. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157-58, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) Still, as the Ninth Circuit explained in Perry v. Brown, at 1071, " in a suit for an injunction against enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state law, it makes no practical difference whether the formal party before the court is the state itself or a state officer in his official capacity." Of course, there are instances where constitutional challenges to state laws might arise in suits against local government units or private parties. Typically in these cases, a procedural rule requires that the state attorney general receive notice of the challenge and, often, an opportunity to participate in the law's defense. [cites] 10 Rule 24 provides in full: allowed when non-parties have a sufficient interest in the action's subject matter and will not be able to protect that interest if they are not named a party to the suit.
11 If an existing party adequately represents the would-be intervenor's interest, however, intervention is denied. 12 Permissive intervention under F.R.C.P. R.24(b) requires less; the proposed intervenor need only have "a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." 13 The federal rules also instruct courts to consider whether the new permissive intervenor "will unduly delay or prejudice" the parties in the existing litigation.
14 Underlying this straightforward text we find, not surprisingly, a host of questions. For would-be intervenors of right, we need to know, for example, how (a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. (b) Permissive Intervention. (1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. (2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on: (A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or (B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order. (3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. (c) Notice and Pleading Required. A motion to intervene must be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
Considerations of timeliness are also paramount for courts in adjudicating intervention motions. [cites to come] Because those considerations are typically not present in the types of cases I focus on here, I do not address them in depth. The district court's timeliness assessment is ordinarily reviewed for abuse of discretion; the circuits vary in how closely they review district court decisions regarding the other FRCP 24(a) factors.
[cites] The rule also allows intervention by those with statutory authorization but no statutes authorize intervention for the initiative proponents and subsets of lawmakers I focus on here so, again, I do not discuss the portions of the intervention rule that address that issue.
More generally, it is well settled that the rule is to be construed liberally. [cites to come] At the same time, however, despite its label, intervention of right is not absolute; courts retain discretion to deny intervention, particularly where movants will not contribute distinctly to the litigation. In granting parents' motion to intervene in a school desegregation suit, Judge Bazelon observed that the "decision whether intervention of right is warranted thus involves an accommodation between two potentially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial economies of scale by resolving related issues in a single lawsuit, and to prevent the single lawsuit from becoming fruitlessly complex or unending." Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 12 See infra at xx. 13 F.R.C.P. R.24(b). 14 Id. much of an interest the proposed intervenor must have in the lawsuit's subject matter. Likewise, we need to know the conditions under which the intervenor's ability to protect that interest will be impaired, and how much similarity must exist between the proposed intervenor and an existing party to find that the intervenor is already adequately represented in the litigation. For would-be permissive intervenors, a central question concerns how much in common the outsider nonparty must have with the main action to become a full party to the litigation. Likewise, we must know how much delay or prejudice to existing parties is too much. The discussion that follows takes up these inquiries.
Intervention of Right
Although there is consensus that intervention of right is a relatively limited procedural option, courts diverge in assessing how much interest the proposed intervenor must have "in the property or transaction that is the subject matter of the action. 15 The basic rule is clear that the interest's sufficiency must be 15 For discussion of the circuit split regarding the need for intervenors to establish independent Article III standing, see infra at xx. Also oft-debated regarding intervention of right is the "adequate representation" inquiry, which can lead a court to deny intervention even if the movant has a sufficient interest in the litigation. Ill. 1996) (holding that "applicants do not need to show, to a certainty, that the City will not fully protect their interests; rather, they need only show that the City might fail to do so").
In the kinds of cases at issue here, where a non-state actor seeks intervention to defend a measure passed by voter initiative, the adequate-representation inquiry should not to pose much of a barrier because initiative promoters arguably bring a different quality of enthusiasm and expertise to the litigation. The inadequacy of government representation is even clearer, of course, where the government defendant opposes the challenged measure.
In addition to the divergence among circuits discussed in the text, circuits have also split over whether an intervenor as of right must have standing independent of the original parties to the suit. For intervenors seeking to defend a ballot measure and lawmakers seeking to defend legislation that they support, an additional challenge lies in showing that the interest, however defined, is at risk of impairment by the ongoing litigation. Because ballot measures do not typically create property or other cognizable rights for their proponents, and because legislation does not typically create rights particular to legislators, it is not clear how proponents or legislators in those contexts can claim any sort of cognizable interest, much less a "significant protectable interest." After all, to take the case of Proposition 8, it is difficult to see how the measure, which restricts the marriage rights of same-sex couples, could impair, practically or otherwise, a protectable interest of its official proponents where none of the individuals identifies as gay or as seeking to marry a same-sex partner, and the sponsoring not-for-profit organization does not claim to include individuals seeking to marry a same-sex partner in its membership. 22 The same is true for BLAG and its effort to defend DOMA. Any others can have "only a generic interest shared by the entire . . . citizenry," and an "interest so generalized will not support a claim for intervention as of right).
27
Consistent with this view, far fewer courts have accepted intervention by subgroups of lawmakers, as will be discussed at greater length infra. Yet for BLAG, as also discussed below, intervention has come easily.
28
The latter part of this Essay will theorize about the reasons for this divergence between Rule 24(a) jurisprudence and its application in Perry and the DOMA cases; for purposes here, the point is simply that, notwithstanding the raft of judicial decisions allowing intervention of right to Proposition 8's proponents and BLAG, it is not obvious that either can claim the interest required of those who seek to intervene as of right.
Permissive Intervention
Perhaps permissive intervention is a better fit for ballot measure sponsors? Recall that permissive intervention's chief requirements are that the moving party have a claim or defense involving a question of fact or law that is common to the original action and that the intervention not unduly delay or prejudice the existing litigants. As the Supreme Court has explained, F.R.C.P. 24(b) "plainly dispenses with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary 25 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm (at 783-but quoting something else). Similar, the Seventh Circuit observed that there is no special public interest rule. [check -not sure this is actually in the op] BUT -No special public interest rule. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268-1269 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Moore's, intervention of right denied to pro-life public interest group seeking to challenge abortion legislation). 26 In Granholm (quoting ." Id. at 345; accord, e.g., Grutter, 188 F.3d at 401 (holding that proposed intervenors, who were applicants to the University of Michigan, had a substantial legal interest in the school's admissions process); Miller, 103 F.3d at 1247 (holding that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce had a substantial legal interest where it was regulated by at least three of the four statutory provisions challenged by plaintiffs). 27 with the intervention loom large. 34 Consequently, when courts believe that a potential intervenor will essentially repeat the same sort of evidence that existing parties will present, they typically characterize intervention as counterproductive and as something that will unnecessarily prolong the litigation. 35 But again, even absent redundancy, the rule's plain text requires that the intervening party have a claim or a defense; nothing in the rule indicates that the intervenor can appear to assert interests it does not possess.
Although adequacy of representation is not formally part of the permissive intervention rule as it is for intervention as of right, courts often consider it as part of this calculus when deciding whether to grant a permissive intervention request. 36 Likewise, if one of the existing parties is the government and that party Perry is a particularly interesting case for exploring the application of this intervention jurisprudence in part because the district court granted only two intervention motions from a much broader array. Most significantly for purposes here, the district court found that Proposition 8's sponsors could intervene as of right under FRCP 24(a), concluding, without explanation, that they had a "significant protectible interest in defending Proposition 8's constitutionality" and that that interest would be affected directly by the lawsuit. 38 The court found as well that their interest "was not represented by another party" because the Attorney General, who was charged with enforcing the measure, had indicated his view that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional. 39 The district court also granted the City of San Francisco's motion to intervene permissively because the City had claimed its financial interest would be adversely affected by Proposition 8. The court made clear that this factor, rather than the City's ability to contribute generally to the factual record, led it to permit intervention. Based on that analysis, the court limited the City's participation in the case to issues related to its financial interest.
40 Proposition 8's promoters faced no similar limitation.
not abuse its discretion when it denied intervention primarily because it found that proposed intervenor's interests were adequately protected by U.S. Government); Arney v. Finney, 967 F.2d 418, 421 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the fact that applicant's interests were adequately represented by class representatives meant applicant had no right to intervene, and was also relevant factor in denial of permissive intervention); At the same time, the court rejected intervention motions by organizations representing same-sex couples and by an organization opposed to marriage rights for same-sex couples. Regarding intervention of right, it found that the organizations representing couples had advanced a sufficient interest but were adequately represented by the existing plaintiffs, and that the proposed defendantintervenor did not have the requisite interest and, even if it did, it was already adequately represented. 41 With respect to permissive intervention, the court held that "the participation of these additional parties would add very little, if anything, to the actual record, but in all probability would consume additional time and resources of both the Court and the parties that have a direct stake in the outcome of these proceedings." 42 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both rulings, consistent with its Circuit's settled recognition of initiative-sponsors as parties. 43 In short, intervention rules operated to filter out many would-be intervenors from the litigation, including those with cognizable injuries as a result of Proposition 8. But they did not serve a gatekeeping role with respect to Proposition 8's official sponsors and instead endowed those sponsors with full status as defendants.
Intervention Rules as Applied II -BLAG and the DOMA cases
The ease with which BLAG intervened in to defend DOMA in multiple federal courts is notable as well. BLAG, a 5-person body comprised of House asserted. Because of this interest, it appears that San Francisco has an independent interest in the proceedings, and the ability to contribute to the development of the underlying issues without materially delaying the proceedings."). 41 Id. at xx. 42 Id. at 53. 43 The organization opposing marriage rights for same-sex couples, The Campaign for California Families, appealed the denial of its interventions motions to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling. Regarding the motion to intervene as of right, the court wrote:
The reality is that the Campaign and those advocating the constitutionality of Prop. 8 have identical interests-that is, to uphold Prop. 8. Any differences are rooted in style and degree, not the ultimate bottom line. Divergence of tactics and litigation strategy is not tantamount to divergence over the ultimate objective of the suit. Because the existing parties will adequately represent the Campaign's interests, we affirm the district court's denial of intervention as of right. Perry v. Brown, 587 F.3d 947, 949 (9 th Cir. 2009). Regarding permissive intervention, the court added that "[i]t was well within the district court's discretion to find that the delay occasioned by intervention outweighed the value added by the Campaign's participation in the suit." Id. at 956. majority and minority leaders, 44 filed intervention motions in numerous DOMA actions after the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it would no longer defend the statute. 45 Most of these motions were unopposed; 46 all have been granted. 2012) ("Plaintiff opposes BLAG's motion to intervene, arguing that it should be limited to amicus curiae status."). In several cases, the DOJ sought to limit BLAG's involvement to making substantive arguments in DOMA's defense. The court in Windsor rejected that argument, see Windsor at 323-25, but the district court in Revelis appeared to accept it. Revelis at 924, 925 (acknowledging DOJ's request that BLAG be "limited to making substantive arguments in support of DOMA, while they continue to file all procedural notices" and holding that "BLAG may intervene for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of DOMA"). Only two opinions gave the intervention motion extended consideration and both found that BLAG had the requisite interest level for intervention of right. In Windsor, the magistrate concluded that "BLAG has a cognizable interest in defending the enforceability of statutes the House has passed when the President declines to enforce them." 48 And in Revelis, the court found that BLAG's interests exceeded those of an "ordinary taxpayer" because " [t] he House has an interest in defending the constitutionality of legislation which it passed when the executive branch declines to do so." 49 The essay's next part shows through Article III case law, why individual representatives and subgroups of legislators, such as BLAG, do not actually have more of a particularized interest than voters or taxpayers in enforcing the statutes they participating in passing. 50 Here, it simply bears noting that although some courts have treated BLAG as though it were the House of Representatives, 51 Although BLAG's submissions supporting intervention have cited to cases involving intervention by the House, Daniel Meltzer observed that "some of these cases . . . involved executive-legislative disagreements about the separation of powers, and in none of them did the congressional intervenor appear actually to have engaged in full-scale litigation in the district court, as distinguished from having defended the statute in connection with a motion for a preliminary injunction, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or a motion for summary judgment on a very limited record, such as affidavits." Daniel Meltzer, 61 Duke L. Rev. 1183, 1210 n.133 (2012). 51 In Revelis, the court deemed "unpersuasive" the plaintiff's contention "that BLAG does not represent Congress as a whole." Revelis, 844 F.Supp.2d at 925. It wrote "BLAG, a five-member bipartisan group, is the mechanism through which the House presents its position in litigation, and courts have allowed it to intervene in cases where appropriate." Id. So, we arrive at our constitutional question: can a ballot initiative proponent or elected officials who has survived the intervention hurdle also satisfy Article III's standing requirements for purposes of defending a challenged enactment. As noted earlier, this question breaks into two -first, whether these actors can derive their standing from the government, and second, whether they have their own particularized interest that suffices to establish standing.
Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Governments -A Quick Primer on Standing
Typical discussions of Article III standing, which arise mainly regarding plaintiffs, 59 stress that parties seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction must establish:
A distinction between standing to intervene and to appeal makes particular sense when the "case or controversy" limitation on the federal judicial power is recalled. Indeed, the circuits have split over whether proposed intervenors must establish Article III standing in addition to satisfying Rule 24's requirements. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 (" [T] he precise relationship between the interest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest required to confer standing, has led to anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals") (citing divergent circuit court cases); id. at 68-69 ("We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III."); McConnell v FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (plurality op.), rev'd on other grounds by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that because existing defendant has standing, "we need not address the standing of the intervenordefendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's") (citations omitted). 59 See supra text at xx. "(1) an injury in fact (i.e. a "concrete and particularized" invasion of a "legally protected interest"); (2) causation (i.e. a ''fairly . . . trace [able] '" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is '"likely"' and not 'merely "speculative"' that the plaintiff's injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit." 60 While some of these concerns are particular to plaintiffs, the Court has reinforced that, even for defendant-intervenors, having a "'direct stake in the outcome'" remains critical. 61 The Court has insisted, further, that federal litigation "is not to be placed in the hands of 'concerned bystanders' who will use it simply as a 'vehicle for the vindication of value interests.'" 62 Separately, the Court has made clear that governments have standing to defend their own laws, including via intervention. Indeed, perhaps because the point seems so obvious, there is relatively little discussion of it in the case law. 
The Limits of Formal Delegation
If only formal conferral was necessary for governments to confer Article III standing to others, the questions on which this Essay focuses could be resolved simply. Although issues particular to the putative delegations to Proposition 8's proponents in Perry or to BLAG in Windsor and the other DOMA cases would remain, 67 there would be little need for extended discussion here.
But statutory conferral of standing, in itself, is not sufficient to satisfy Article III. Indeed, it is "settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing 64 The case arose from the federal government's prosecution of a bait-seller under a federal statute that made it a crime to import fish or wildlife in violation of state law. Maine intervened, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2403(b), which authorizes states to intervene in federal proceedings where the constitutionality of state laws is challenged. After the First Circuit invalidated the Maine bait law that underlay the prosecution, the federal government noticed an appeal to the Supreme Court but then dismissed its appeal voluntarily. Maine, 477 U.S. at 137 n.5. 65 Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (explaining that creation and enforcement of a civil and criminal code is an "easily identified" sovereign interest).
28 U.S.C. §2403(b). The statute provides in full:
In any action, suit, or proceeding in a court of the United States to which a State or any agency, officer, or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The State shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality. 
The Government-Mantle Theory of Standing and the Legislature-as-a-Whole
Since formal authorization alone does not satisfy Article III, the next question we must address is whether individuals and organizations that seek to defend official enactments can derive their standing from the government's standing to defend its own laws. In theory, this could be accomplished either by the government delegating its standing or by others taking up the government's mantle and stepping into legislative-defense role voluntarily in the government's absence. The discussion in the sections that follow will begin by considering the arguments favoring these sorts of standing transfers. My ultimate argument, though, is that the government-mantle theory, while conceivably viable for legislatures as a whole, is neither doctrinally permissible nor normatively sensible for others.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has kept a tight constraint on government standins for Article III purposes, recognizing full legislatures, but few others, as qualified federal court litigants. Although it has offered almost no explanation, the Court seems to believe that the lawmaking body should be able to defend its work if the executive branch does not. In the New Jersey minute-of-silence case, for example, the Court allowed a circuit decision to stand where the state's Attorney General had declined to defend the law and the state General Assembly speaker and Senate president had obtained authorization to intervene on the legislature's in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so. Perry, 631 F.3d 1052 (9 th Cir. 2012). Cf. id. at 1072 ("The State's highest court thus held that California law provides precisely what the Arizonans Court found lacking in Arizona law: it confers on the official proponents of an initiative the authority to assert the State's interests in defending the constitutionality of that initiative, where the state officials who would ordinarily assume that responsibility choose not to do so."). 73 It wrote that "under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Elections Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative measure are authorized to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity, enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative." Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal.4 th 116, xx (2011). " [T] he role played by the proponents in such litigation," the court explained, "is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a challenged provision may be sustained." Id. at 525. 74 See supra at xx. behalf. 75 Similarly, the Court has accepted that Congress, with proper authorization, can step in to defend a statute, consistent with Article III, if the executive branch or one of its agencies accepts the plaintiff's contention that the challenged measure is unconstitutional. In INS v. Chadha, the Court wrote, regarding Congress's intervention where the INS declined to defend an immigration statute, that "[w]e have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional." 76 Allowing the legislature as a whole to step into the government's shoes for Article III purposes is arguably consistent with governments' standing to intervene in defense of their own laws -any time a statute is challenged, the government's enforcement powers are at risk of diminishment. While the legislature does not have its own enforcement powers, one could reasonably argue that the government mantle can apply because its lawmaking responsibilities satisfy Article III's "direct stake" requirement. Given that the Court reinforced the Congress-as-proper-party point in Arizonans, the absence of meaningful precedential support in Chadha might not be as troubling as it seems. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 65n.20. 77 My tentative view is that this argument is not persuasive for reasons related to those the Court gave in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) regarding the U.S. government's institutional design, see infra at xx, but fuller discussion of this point is beyond the scope here.
Individual Legislators, Legislative Subgroups, and the Limits of the Government-Mantle Theory
If a legislature can establish Article III standing to defend its enactments, then why not individual legislators who supported, and perhaps even led the charge to have a challenged measure enacted? Here, the Court has drawn a sharp line, rejecting federal jurisdiction even for legislators who have statutory support for their intervention, unless those legislators seek federal jurisdiction for a narrow set of actions related to the voting process rather than outcomes.
This issue -and the contrast between full legislature's and individual legislators' standing to invoke federal jurisdiction in constitutional litigation regarding government enactments -arose most starkly in Raines v. Byrd, where six members of Congress had statutory authorization to challenge the Line Item Veto Act on constitutional grounds. 78 To establish Article III standing, the members argued that the veto law diminished their political power. The Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' institutional injury assertion as "wholly abstract and widely dispersed," holding that "these individual members of Congress do not have a sufficient 'personal stake' in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have standing." Similarly, the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge district court that found no Article III standing where a senator sought to carry out "his special [institutional] duties and responsibilities" and had statutory authorization to bring suit in federal court. 80 Noting that the decision to appoint Judge Mikva did not diminish the effectiveness of the senator's vote or otherwise injure his interests, the district court concluded that individual members of Congress were "powerless to procure" federal standing in this way, and that Congressional authorization to file suit could not confer on them "a 'right' to seek a decision from a federal court." 81 While individual legislators cannot claim the government's mantle for enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court has found that they can invoke federal jurisdiction to protect the voting process and their own election. That is, their roles enable them to establish a "direct stake" in the lawmaking process even if they cannot claim that stake in the outcomes. For example, in Coleman v. Miller, the Court found Article III standing for a group of legislators who challenged the process by which the state legislature ratified a proposed U.S. constitutional amendment regarding child labor. 82 Still, exhibiting some sensitivity to having With the vote deadlocked 20 to 20, the amendment ordinarily would not have been ratified. However, the State's Lieutenant Governor, the presiding officer of the State Senate, cast a deciding vote in favor of the amendment, and it was deemed ratified (after the State House of Representatives voted to ratify it). The 20 State Senators who had voted against the amendment, joined by a 21st State Senator and three State House Members, filed an action in the Kansas Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus that would compel the appropriate state officials to recognize that the legislature had not in fact ratified the amendment. That court held that the members of the legislature had standing to bring their mandamus action, but ruled against them on the merits. This Court affirmed. By a vote of 5-4, we held that the members of the legislature had standing. In explaining our holding, we repeatedly emphasized that if these legislators (who were suing as a bloc) were correct on the merits, then their votes not to ratify the amendment were deprived of all validity. allowed individual legislators to achieve Article III standing, even related to the voting process, the Court later stressed that Coleman was "[t]he one case in which we have upheld standing for legislators (albeit state legislators) claiming an institutional injury."
83 To achieve Article III standing under Coleman, the Court also suggested that legislators would have to "allege[] that they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated." 84 The other oft-cited case to support individual legislator standing, Powell v.
McCormack,
85 is even more limited. There, Representative Adam Clayton Powell succeeded in establishing Article III standing but only because he suffered an individualized and concrete injury of the sort easily recognized by standard doctrine when he was barred from taking his seat and salary in the House of Representatives after having been duly elected.
86
Whither BLAG?
As the case law just discussed makes plain, BLAG, as a subgroup of the House of Representatives, or even as the official representative of the House, 87 is not well positioned to claim Article III standing to defend DOMA. 88 The reason, again, is that it cannot claim the government's enforcement powers; nor can the government's decisions about enforcement strategy be said to present the sort of Raines, 511 U.S. at 822 (footnote and citation omitted). 83 Raines, 521 U.S. 811, 821. The Court added: "It is obvious, then, that our holding in Coleman stands (at most, see n. 8, infra ) for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified." Id. at 822. See also Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that ten legislators lacked standing to seek enforcement of abortion restrictions and describing Coleman as limiting legislator standing to cases involving alleged "distortion of the legislative process" and not authorizing standing for legislators who object on constitutional grounds to a properly enacted law). 84 Raines, 521 U.S. at 824. 85 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 86 Id. at 512-14 (1969). 87 There is no apparent support for BLAG having this representative status. See supra xx. 88 Unlike in Perry, where the intervenors' inability to attain Article III standing requires dismissal, see infra, there is a strong argument that the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to hear Windsor, even without BLAG having its own Article III standing. The United States is subject to a court order requiring reimbursement of taxes to Edie Windsor, the plaintiff-respondent. In addition, its enforcement powers are diminished by DOMA's invalidation, even if it is in agreement with that determination. I do not address the Supreme Court's related jurisdictional question in Windsor regarding " [w] hether the Executive Branch's agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this Court of jurisdiction to decide this case" as it discussion of it would extend well beyond this essay's scope.
limited process-based challenges that have occasionally been permitted. 89 Presumably for this reason, most of BLAG's prior involvement in other federal litigation has come in the form of amicus brief participation rather than through intervention seeking full party status.
90

Private Actors and the Government Mantle
The question remains whether private actors can claim the government's mantle, either with the government's endorsement, as in Perry, or without. Because Perry presents the strongest version of this claim that governments can delegate their Article III standing, we will begin there and then consider the full array of arguments that might support individuals and organizations stepping in when government declines to defend a challenged law. As will be quickly apparent, though, the doctrine leaves little room for private actors to establish the interest and injury required by Article III in this context, and the theories that might enable initiative proponents to stand out from among other private actors would, if accepted, undermine Article III as a meaningful limitation on federal jurisdiction. intervenor's assertion of an interest nor the government's authorization suffices to confer standing. 93 Indeed, the Supreme Court has spoken quite pointedly against the easy attribution of standing to initiative proponents. In addressing Arizona's official-English initiative for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg confirmed that "this Court has never identified initiative proponents as Article-III-qualified defenders." 94 Private actors seeking to insure that the laws and Constitution are properly enforced outside the initiative context fare no better vis a vis Article III. In fact, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that "[a]n interest shared generally with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution and laws will not do." 95 Nearly a century ago, the Court faced the issue of private actors seeking to ensure government accountability in a suit by a citizen who was also a taxpayer and a member of the American Constitution League to challenge the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification process. 96 Although the plaintiff claimed injury in that "[f]ree citizens would be deprived of their right to have such elections duly held, the effectiveness of their votes would be diminished, and election expenses would be nearly doubled," the Court found that he lacked a sufficient interest for Article III standing. 97 Some decades later, the Court reinforced the point in rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge a state law, explaining that the party invoking federal jurisdiction "must be able to show . . . that he has sustained . . . some direct injury . . . and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.'" 98 And again, the Court reinforced that generalized grievances are 93 See supra at xx. 94 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). 95 Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-576). Similarly, in In Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam), the Supreme Court found no Article III standing for a member of the Supreme Court bar who sought to challenge Justice Black's appointment based on the Constitution's Ineligibility Clause. The Court explained: It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Id. at 634. 96 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 97 Id. at 127, 129. 98 Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (citation omitted). Not surprisingly, then, "when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Lujan at 562 (citations omitted). insufficient for standing purposes in response to a federal taxpayer who sought information about the Central Intelligence Agency's expenditures pursuant to the Constitution's Statement and Account Clause so that he could "intelligently follow the actions of Congress or the Executive" and "properly fulfill his obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for candidates seeking national office."
99 As the Court reiterated, this desire to have the law enforced in a particular way "is surely [] a generalized grievance . . . since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public.'" 100 Individuals who have pursued what they perceived as the government's interests by seeking to defend official enactments have similarly been deemed to lack an adequately individualized stake. In Diamond v. Charles, for example, the Court rejected a doctor's proposed intervention to defend a state abortion restriction on the ground that it was "simply an effort to compel the State to enact a code in accord with [the doctor's] interests."
101 This "expression of a desire that [a law] as written be obeyed" is one available to the sovereign, which has a "direct stake" in defending its laws, but not to a citizen with no individualized injury.
102
But perhaps one might argue that initiative proponents are differently situated to pursue the government's interests when they seek to enforce a law that they have sponsored, particularly when they have been authorized by the state, as Proposition 8's proponents purportedly were. 103 In particular, the qui tam cases might be invoked for support because the Court has permitted private actors to invoke federal jurisdiction in the course of actions seeking redress related to alleged fraud against the United States. 104 In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. U.S. ex rel Stevens, for example, the Court acknowledged that the private actor, known as the relator, does not suffer an invasion of its own legally protected interest in a conventional sense. 105 Instead, the interest is that of the United States and "the 'right' he seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize until the litigation is completed and the relator prevails."
106 But, the Court found, standing exists because the relator is a partial assignee of the United States' fraud claim, so that, when the relator files, it is pursuing its own interests.
107
Unfortunately for initiative proponents, the government cannot assign the interests that give rise to standing in this context. That is, while a government can assign its claim for financial compensation, as in the qui tam context, its enforcement powers are not similarly alienable.
108
Perhaps initiative proponents are more like representatives of the legislature than like assignees of the government, drawing on Karcher's and Chadha's acceptance of legislative bodies' Article III standing. 109 Here, the argument would be that, like those leaders, the initiative proponents are preserving the voters' power to see that their initiative-enacted laws are enforced. The difficulties with this position, though, are several. First, it is factually weak. Sponsoring individuals and organizations are enthusiastic supporters of proposed legislation but they are not enactors. That role belongs to the voting public. As leading 105 Id. A concrete interest in the suit's outcome, alone, is insufficient because, as the Court explained, that is not necessarily an interest related to an injury in fact -even someone who has wagered on the outcome of a lawsuit could be said to have a concrete interest. Id. 106 Id. at 773. See also id. ("[A]n interest that is merely a 'byproduct' of the suit itself cannot give rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes."). 107 Id. at 773 (affirming "the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor"). The Court elaborated this point in Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Svcs., Inc., 544 U.S. 269 (2008) , where assignees of payphone operators had brought compensation claims in federal court but had promised to pay proceeds from those claims to the assignor. Reviewing historical practice in England and the U.S., the Court observed that " [w] here assignment at issue, courts . . . have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and . . . there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection." Id. at 286. The Court reinforced the point by reference to Vermont Agency, reiterating that, in the context of qui tam claims, private actors standing arises from its possessing an assigned interest from the United States. Id. See also id. at 289 (describing assignment as conferring a "property right"); 290 (describing assignees as asserting "legal rights of their own") (emphasis in original). 108 Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) ("[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.'") (citation omitted). 109 A separate argument might seek to recognize initiative sponsors as an alternate legal defense team for the state when the usual defense group is not available. Cf. Perry v. Brown, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d at 525 (" [T] he role played by the proponents in such litigation," the court explained, "is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a challenged provision may be sustained."). This is not a reading that the Ninth Circuit embraced, see supra, nor could it have, since counsel to a party does not have standing to pursue an appeal that the party itself declines to pursue. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 458 U.S. at 751 (requiring that a party "allege personal injury") (emphasis added).
supporters, proponents are more like individual lawmakers -perhaps closest to the lead sponsor of a piece of legislation. And individual lawmakers, as we know, may have a cognizable interest in the voting process 110 but they do not have Article III jurisdiction for claims that would have the state enforce its laws in a particular way.
Second, there is nothing in the initiative process framework to justify treating proponents as the voters' proxy in litigation, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's suggestion in Perry that ballot measure sponsors have special, distinguishing responsibilities.
111 Unlike in legislatures, where governing rules frequently designate the leadership to appear on the body's behalf in a range of proceedings, initiative statutes focus almost entirely on the steps in the process -how many signatures must sponsors obtain to put a measure on the ballot; how those signatures will be assessed; what sorts of information goes into a voter guide; etc.
112 Not a single provision bears remotely on enforcement, or even defense, of a proposed measure. Against this background, the state could conceivably designate anyone in the voting population, or even anyone at all, to handle the voters-aslawmakers enforcement action. After all, even from within the process-focused rules, there is no requirement that the initiative sponsor be either the most effective or the most generous initiative supporter or the one, for that matter, that the voters would have chosen.
113
In this sense, the initiative process laws on which Perry relied to distinguish Proposition 8's proponents from the measures' other supporters are most analogous to provisions that set out the legislature's lawmaking processes. It is not a serious argument that these sorts of measures should help an individual legislator overcome the standing hurdle to defend a measure enacted according to these processes; nor should it be that the analogous voter initiative provisions give official sponsors access to federal jurisdiction once the initiative has passed. because of their involvement in getting a particular piece of legislation passed. But dedication of time and resources also cannot be what confers Article III standing on proponents to defend the measures they help pass. If it were enough, then there should be no difference between the official ballot sponsors and other, non-official initiative supporters that make equivalent contributions. 114 In effect, then, returning to where this Essay started, the state could choose anyone in Defendantville to do the job of representing the voters.
Still, even if we accept initiative sponsors as the voters' representatives, the requisite interest for Article III standing does not follow because the voters would be seeking federal jurisdiction for the purpose of having the state enforce the law consistent with their preferences. That aim, as discussed above, is precisely the sort of "generalized grievance" that the Court has rejected in the past as 114 Indeed, alternative frameworks might award of standing to whoever is deemed to have contributed most financially or otherwise. One can easily imagine scenarios where an organization that rushed to become a measure's official sponsor turned out not to take leadership of the initiative campaign or even, conceivably, to support the initiative at election time. For obvious reasons, formal deference to official sponsorship might not make sense but neither would having a court try to sift among competing proponents to select one for the grant of standing. A resort to random selection would likewise present many difficulties, as would the option of open-door participation.
insufficiently particularized.
115
None of this is to say that states must keep initiative proponents, organizational advocates, or even taxpayers from intervening to defend state laws in state courts. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has made clear repeatedly, state courts are not burdened by Article III's constraints. 116 But it is to say that a state cannot, even with the best of intentions, extend its sovereignty to a private actor for purposes of standing in federal court.
115 See supra at xx; Lujan, at 573-74 (stating that an abstract interest in the government's "proper application of the Constitution and laws" cannot justify Article III standing); FEC v. Akins (rejecting individual enforcement of general constitutional provisions); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178 (1974) (finding no Article III standing for individuals "to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action" based on "a general interest common to all members of the public") (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
Further, if we accept that the voters-as-lawmakers are entitled to access federal court to defend their initiatives, it is not clear why they could not access federal court to assert their interests in other ways, including to defend measures enacted by elected representatives or even to demand particular types of legislation. Surely the voters have as much stake as their elected representatives in defending enacted measures and in the legislative process working properly; the distinction between direct and representative democracy should not make a difference for Article III purposes. Yet to permit voter standing in these circumstances, even by someone purporting to represent voters at large would be, again, to open the federal courts to those with non-particularized interests. It could even follow, arguably, that the authority to stand in for the legislature's interests should be available to anyone purporting to represent the lawmaking body, whether in or outside of the legislature. While it might be logical and convenient to reserve that role to the legislative body's leadership, it cannot be that the state's grant of permission is the linchpin for representative standing without conceding, contrary to decades of standing jurisprudence, that governments can legislature around the strictures of Article III. [more to come]
In addition, allowing the voters to "take their state to court," in effect, by giving them the authority to act on the state's behalf arguably creates a Pennhurst problem by permitting federal courts to adjudicate alleged violations of state law. Although the California Supreme Court found that the state had consented to being represented by the initiative proponents, it is not clear that that consent satisfies the "clear waiver" requirement. [ 
Beyond the mantle-of-government theory -the injury-in-fact problem for initiative proponents and legislators
Given that legislators and initiative proponents cannot claim a governmental, or even quasi-governmental, interest, they must demonstrate another cognizable interest if they are to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction in defense of an initiated measure. Yet for the reasons just discussed, participation in the political process, even as a ballot measure sponsor or lawmaker, does not give rise to the sort of distinctive, palpable interest that generates Article III standing.
What about passion, then? 117 The familiar doctrine bears repeating because, as explored further below, concerns about excluding a measure's most passionate supporters seem to drive, at least subliminally, some of the judicial decisionmaking in this area.
The Court faced the question squarely over 40 years ago in Sierra Club v. Morton, when it rejected the position that a litigant could gain standing based either on its own commitment to an issue or as the representative of the commitments and interests of others. 118 As the Court explained in the context of an environmental-protection suit brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved.'" 119 Since then, the Court has reiterated the point in other contexts, too, making clear that while an individual's or organization's interests might conflict sharply with the government or other adverse party, "motivation is not a substitute for the actual injury needed by the courts . . . ."
120
The Court's explanation is as important as its conclusion because it shows why initiative proponents and legislators cannot possibly claim Article III standing by virtue of their heightened concern for the issue implicated by the measure they promoted. "[I]f a 'special interest' in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide 'special interest' organization however small or short-lived," the Court wrote. 121 It continued: "And if any group with a bona fide 'special interest' could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so."
122
IV. Procedural Legitimacy and the Costs of Exclusion
One might ask, still, whether this is the system we want or, put another way, whether policy or other arguments ought to compel a rethinking of standing doctrine in this area. I turn first to Court's observations about this normative question and then consider how thinking about the question from nonconsequentialist and consequentialist perspectives might help.
In U.S. v. Richardson, the Court confronted the consequences of its ruling that a private party lacked standing to demand that the Central Intelligence Agency act consistently with its constitutional obligation to provide an accounting of its expenditures because he had not suffered a personalized injury.
123 "It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so," the Court acknowledged. The same is true for Proposition 8 -if the state declines to defend and the measure's proponents lack Article III standing, the litigation cannot properly continue past the district court. Richardson at 177 ("While we can hardly dispute that this respondent has a genuine interest in the use of funds and that his interest may be prompted by his status as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute.").
121 Sierra Club at 739. 122 Id. at 739-40. 123 418 U.S. 166 (1974) . 124 There is no Article III problem in the district court because the parties invoking federal jurisdiction the suit alleged a concrete and particularized injury brought on by the state's refusal to allow them to marry.
[cite] Likewise, the fact that the governor and attorney general agreed with positioned differently because the federal government has sought review in each case.) 125 The Court responded to what might seem a troubling result by situating it within the Framers' political vision for the United States, with the allocation of some disputes to the judiciary and others to the political process.
The Constitution created a representative Government with the representatives directly responsible to their constituents at stated periods of two, four, and six years; that the Constitution does not afford a judicial remedy does not, of course, completely disable the citizen who is not satisfied with the 'ground rules' established by the Congress for reporting expenditures of the Executive Branch. Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls. 126 Indeed, the Court's observation is an important reminder that relaxing Article III's constraints in the context of voter initiatives or other popular measures would have consequences that extend beyond the jurisprudential to the very nature of our government structure. Somewhat dramatically, the Court proclaimed: "Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts." 127 Continuing, the Court made an observation that seems tailor-made for both BLAG and Proposition 8's proponents: Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.
In other words, when we step back to consider whether it might be best to ease Article III's requirements in the voter initiative context, it bears remembering that far more is in play than the frustration of initiative supporters and supporters of a the plaintiffs about Proposition 8's invalidity did not vitiate the case or controversy within the meaning of Article III; only an injunction ordering the State not to enforce the measure could sufficiently remedy the plaintiffs' alleged injury. 125 See supra n. xx. 126 U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 127 Id. particular law if a federal appeal is foreclosed.
Considering additional non-consequentialist and consequentialist arguments for and against allowing intervention and standing in these contexts proves useful, too. On the non-consequentialist side, we could say that permitting private actors and legislators to participate in defending government action is a good in itself. For initiative proponents, the argument is strongest -the very point of the initiative process is to enable and encourage citizens to participate directly in government. This argument could also be extended to support inclusion of legislators and even citizen-lobbyists as defendants in suits regarding measures they supported. It is reasonable to think that opening this part of the process could foster even greater civic engagement. To return to the illustration from the Essay's outset, if there really was a Defendantville, its inhabitants presumably would feel more a part of government if they knew they could not only advocate for laws but also defend those laws against post-enactment challenge challenges.
More pragmatically, it seems obvious that those who are both highly passionate and knowledgeable about a particular measure are likely to bring robust arguments into the litigation process. And, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, government cannot necessarily be counted on to do the same, particularly if it disagrees with the measure's very merits. Indeed, to the extent citizens turned to voter initiatives to avoid the legislature, it seems reasonable to assume that those same citizens will be more apt to fully illuminate issues and arguments that the reviewing court would want to consider.
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Also obvious, particularly in the voter initiative context, is that blocking private actors from defending measures they have worked energetically to pass could have a range of negative public effects. 129 Most directly, decisions along those lines may discourage others from becoming involved in the legislative process. To the extent a state values its initiative system, as California does, this risk could be seen as substantial.
Further, if courts are seen as shutting their doors to keep engaged citizens from defending "their" laws, the risk is not only disillusionment but also heightened distrust of the judiciary. After all, the Article III concerns that would require such 128 Yniguez at 733 ("The official sponsors of a ballot initiative have a strong interest in the vitality of a provision of the state constitution which they proposed and for which they vigorously campaigned. The district court's decision striking down Article XXVIII essentially nullified the considerable efforts AOE made to have the initiative placed on the ballot and to obtain its passage."). The California Supreme Court, among others, has made this point as well. [cite] 129 Also, with respect to challenges to state law measures, the Article II concerns about diminishing the unitary executive if "outsiders" represent the government are not present. [cite] a decision are not likely to come through sympathetically, if at all, in news media coverage. 130 Indeed, general faith in government can only be hurt if the state or federal government refuses to defend a law and the initiative proponents or legislators who supported it are barred from taking an appeal if the measure is struck down.
Countermajoritarian anxiety and guilt at work
These points, taken together, help to explain why some courts, perhaps including the Ninth Circuit in Perry and the federal courts that have decided DOMA cases, deviate from the seemingly clear limitations imposed by the federal intervention rules and Article III when considering the role of initiative proponents and legislators in defending official enactments. To put them into jurisprudentially familiar terms, we might say that these courts are being driven by a combination of countermajoritarian anxiety and countermajoritarian guilt.
On the anxiety side, the fear is, as just noted, that the adjudication process will fall apart in some way if a ballot measure sponsor or subgroup of legislators is denied standing to appeal the measure's invalidation, especially in circumstances where the government itself declines to appeal. 131 The litigation might be diminished without the benefit of the proponents' arguments and, further, the reputation of the court and the political process may suffer immeasurable damage by the proponents' exclusion.
Guilt seems also to be operative, especially in the voter initiative context. After all, stepping back from standing doctrine's fine points, it can seem unfair, in a Lockean sense, to take those who labored to pass legislation and preclude them from defending their work. 132 Strains of due process jurisprudence also reinforce this sense of countermajoritarian guilt, suggesting that it is procedurally as well as substantively unfair to deprive ballot measure sponsors or even voters 133 of a meaningful opportunity to be heard in defense of the measure they helped pass. This anxiety and guilt, when left unexposed, risk obscuring the significant costs associated with allowing governments to delegate their authority to private actors and individual legislators. Most fundamentally, private parties, no matter how engaged in the political process, are not subject to any of the accountabilityoriented limitations that are in place, formally and normatively, to constrain government actors. There are no transparency requirements, few ethical limitations, and no obligation to carry forward the public interest rather than their own (or to take into account conflicting views of the public interest). Even legislators, as individuals and in subgroups, are not subject to the same limitations as the government as a whole.
Relatedly, and as a partial result of these constraints being absent, private parties and legislative subgroups are free to argue whatever they wish in the guise of government interests when they pursue appeals under the government's mantle. So, for example, Proposition 8's sponsors could freely argue that heterosexual parents should be privileged over gay parents 134 even though California law and policy affirmatively rejected that position. Indeed, Proposition 8's sponsors could have argued -as state interests -that gay people are mentally ill, child molesters, and otherwise dangerous to society had they chosen to do so, notwithstanding that nothing in California law supports those positions. 135 The same is true for BLAG. 136 This setup presents its own sort of legitimacy risk, where courts can be seen as giving any group -regardless of how divisive -a governmental platform for advancing its views.
Thus, just as it seems wrong to bar private actors and legislators from participating fully in a measure's defense, so too does it seem wrong to allow those actors to function as the government when they do not share the government's enforcement interest or accountability constraints.
Procedural accommodations
The question, then, is how, procedurally, to accommodate the assortment of concerns in play -fairness, guilt, anxiety, and judicial legitimacy writ largetogether with the real constraints of intervention rules and Article III. Simply condemning the concerns as unreasonable and advocating a hard doctrinal line will not do; after all, these concerns, articulated and not, are likely to influence the 134 In fact, Proposition 8's sponsors made this argument, asserting that "children are better off when raised by two biological parents and that society can increase the likelihood of that family structure by allowing only potential biological parents-one man and one woman-to marry." Perry, at 1096. While this argument was not as overtly hostile to gay parents as similar claims from amicus Campaign for California Families, the result was, in effect, to advocate, on the state's behalf, a legislative preference for heterosexual parents. 135 These two assertions, which once had much traction in antigay arguments, have long been With respect to guilt, which is the more inward-looking of the strands of legitimacy concerns, it may help to recall that any deprivation caused to private parties is not categorical. In the state court system, an initiative proponent or other private actor can participate in a state law's defense as fully as the state will allow, entirely free from Article III constraints. Of course, the availability of state-court standing will be cold comfort to an advocate if litigation is brought in federal court and it will typically be of little help to members of Congress. In these circumstances, perhaps the best a court can do is to provide an accessible explanation of federal courts' limited powers 137 and to reinforce that fairness concerns, however powerful, cannot overcome the constraints of Article III.
Countermajoritarian anxiety about deficiencies in the adjudication process and harms to judicial legitimacy if private actors and legislators cannot intervene to defend a challenged measure can be more readily addressed. With respect to the process itself, amicus curiae status is already routinely granted to insure that courts receive a robust set of arguments and to enable at least some participation by those with a strong interest in the case. 138 While amicus briefs may be adequate in most circumstances, courts might also considering authorizing certain amici to participate more extensively in litigation. This "litigating amicus" status has long been available, at the discretion of district courts, 139 to enable amici to engage in discovery and participate in trial, including by calling and questioning witnesses. 140 Of course, allowing extensive involvement by amici risks inefficiencies and worse, 141 but enough courts have granted litigating amicus status to suggest that careful management can control for these problems while maximizing the benefits from the additional participation. 142 Further, courts can -and already do -try to anticipate reputational backlash from potentially divisive decisions through the way in which they communicate their decisions. Often, in difficult circumstances, courts take space at the outset of an opinion to explain that their judicial role requires them to do whatever they have done. 143 We see much evidence of this in the marriage cases, where court can allow amici to call their own witnesses and cross examine the witnesses of other parties" but also that litigating amici are "precluded from engaging in adversarial activities such as motions to compel" and from taking appeals"). 141 In a strong critique of a lower court decision to permit a litigating amicus, where the amicus had brought contempt claims against the defendant in the district court, the circuit court decried "this legal mutant characterized as "litigating amicus curiae," and warned that allowing such status to non-parties "will implicate and erode the future core stability of American adversary jurisprudence as we know it today." U.S. v. State of Mich., 940 F.2d 143, 163-167 (6th Cir. 1991).
The court added that allowing expanded amicus participation "would extend carte blanche discretion to a trial judge to convert the trial court into a free-wheeling forum of competing special interest groups capable of frustrating and undermining the ability of the named parties/real parties in interest to expeditiously resolve their own dispute and capable of complicating the court's ability to perform its judicial function." Id. While other courts have expressed concerns about the litigating amicus role, the Sixth Circuit's opinion is unusual for its energetic skepticism. 142 See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 820 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting with approval that "counsel for amici toured [the defendant's] facilities, located and interviewed amici's expert witnesses, attended without participating in the depositions taken by the parties, actually participated in the depositions of amici's witnesses, and prepared pretrial memoranda on behalf of amici. Amici's counsel also presented amici's witnesses at trial and cross-examined plaintiffs' and defendants' witnesses."); Alliance of Automobile Mfrs. v. Gwadowsky, 297 F.Supp.2d 305, 306-308 (D. Me. 2003) (granting "amicus curiae 'plus' status, but with restrictions" including "requiring "notice and service of all documents and events just as if it were a party to the case" and some participation in discovery and at trial but excluding "an independent right to engage in written forms of discovery"); Daggett v. Webster, 190 F.R.D. 12, 14-15 (D. Me. 1999) (ordering that "all documents must be given to amici as if they were parties and amici have ability to, with witness's acquiescence, examine or cross-examine a witness (as long as Attorney General's office does not also examine or cross-examine").
decisions frequently come across as though courts are apologizing to one disappointed constituency or another for the outcome. 144 While this is no guarantee that those careful comments will reach the general public, which overwhelmingly learns about decisions from media accounts rather than from judicial opinions, 145 it is at least a protective step that courts can take for themselves.
V. Conclusion
At the end of the day, no matter how powerful the anxiety nor how wrenching the guilt that might flow from limiting private individuals and legislators' participation, federal courts are simply not open-door institutions for dispute resolution, including for contentious legal and social conflicts. Instead, to grapple realistically with intervention rules and Article III jurisprudence means that even the most enthusiastic defenders of challenged laws cannot alchemize a cognizable interest that their circumstances do not otherwise create. Nor can they properly claim the mantle of governmental standing, no matter how willing the government is to share or delegate its access.
Instead, federal courts are limited to authorizing amicus status for those whose strongest connection to the challenged measure is an intense interest either in favor or against. And while federal circuit courts can virtually always hear appeals from governments desiring to defend their own laws, they cannot make space on their docket when it is only individual citizens or legislators who are seeking review, no matter how politically desirable that review might be.
